Anthropology through Levinas : knowing the uniqueness of ego and the mystery of otherness by Rapport, Nigel Julian
Anthropology through Levinas
Author(s): Nigel Rapport
Source: Current Anthropology,  (-Not available-), p. 000
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/680433 .
Accessed: 24/03/2015 06:37
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
 .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 .
The University of Chicago Press and Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Current Anthropology.
http://www.jstor.org 
This content downloaded from 138.251.162.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CAI FORUM ON THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY
Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015 000Anthropology through Levinas
Knowing the Uniqueness of Ego and the Mystery of Otherness
by Nigel RapportAn anthropological commonplace since Evans-Pritchard has been that ethnographic subjects will have their ra-
tionality circumscribed by the discursive opportunities made available by a “culture.” Hence, social science comes
dom
accep
q 201to terms with the “internal” nature of judgements (Winch). Ultimately, the relativist nature of both Winch’s and
Evans-Pritchard’s conclusion has its source in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. For Wittgenstein, “the limits of my
language mean the limits of my world.” Moreover, “language” in this connection extends to the “textual” nature of
behavior per se. There exists a determining habituation of embodiment and dwelling as well as of reasoning, be-
lieving, and talking. This article explores the nature of a pretextual or nontextual sphere that exists beyond con-
ventional—“cultural”—languages. Wittgensteinian assumptions are set against those of Max Stirner and Emmanuel
Levinas. While in many ways disparate, the writings of Stirner on the ego and of Levinas on the “other” both insist
that knowledge can be derived—knowledge, indeed, of a fundamental, even absolute, nature—by way of a tran-
scending of a taken-for-granted symbolic, conceptual, textual, and doctrinal language-world. What is key is the
attention one pays to corporeality: to the “ﬂesh and mind” of the self (Stirner), to the “body and face” of the other
(Levinas). The article is theoretical and epistemological in register. An ethnographic afterword points in the di-
rection of how the argument might be grounded in representations of ﬁeldwork encounters.
rough my small, bonebound island I have learnt all I because one has no other idiom in which to express oTh
know, experienced all, and sensed all.
—(Dylan Thomas, letter to Pamela Hansford John-
ne’s
thoughts—has its source inWittgenstein’s “ordinary-language
philosophy.” In Wittgenstein’s own words, “the limits of myson, November 1933 [1966:48])
It has been a commonplace in anthropology since Evans-
Pritchard that one anticipates ethnographic subjects—in-
cluding anthropologists themselves—as having their ratio-
nality circumscribed by, indeed deﬁned by, the discursive
opportunities made available to them by a “culture.” The
latter entailed a moral system, not a natural system. Hence,
belief in witchcraft may be “rational” according to the cos-
mological worldview within which observation, explanation,
reaction, and social interaction must symbolically function
(Evans-Pritchard 1937). The “idea of a social science” is to
come to terms with the “internal” nature of judgments, as
Peter Winch (1970:107) famously phrased it, internal to the
subjects’ discursive possibilities. Ultimately, the relativist na-
ture of both Winch’s and Evans-Pritchard’s conclusion—that
one cannot reason outside, or against, a system of beliefs,
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All use subject to JSTORlanguage mean the limits of my world” (1922:5.6). Language
is instrumental in determining a life-world, or “form of life,”
and the latter must be accepted as a given; so that “what we
cannot talk about we must pass over in silence” (Wittgen-
stein 1922:7). Moreover, “language” in this connection can
be understood as extending to behavior as such, given the
“textual” or patterned nature of the latter. To say that one is
immersed in a form of life is tantamount to saying that there
exists a determining habituation of one’s embodiment and
environmental dwelling as well as of one’s reasoning, be-
lieving, and talking. One dwells within an environing, and
limiting, habitus as well as within a language-game. All is
determinately textualized.
This article explores the nature of a possible pretextual
or nontextual sphere, however, that exists beyond ordinary
or conventional—“cultural”—language, that human beings
nevertheless inhabit and, moreover, from which they have
the capacity to extract rational knowledge. The “pretextual”
invites us beyond the domain of conventional conceptuali-
zation and classiﬁcation, beyond the commonsensical and
habitual, to a place from which we begin to know, again, as
human beings.
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The challenge is to argue for this rationality and describe
the procedure of a pretextual knowing. What is the nature
of the knowing subject, and what is the nature of the known
its, after all, must be worked at, practiced, if they are to be
maintained, and any can be broken. The language-speaker and
culture-member remains a reﬂexive, “ironizing” agent (Rap-
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015object, if these were to be reconﬁgured in an anthropological
discipline whose tradition (at least since the days of Herder)
has been to deny, or at least bracket off, the domain of “the
human” and of universal “human being,” urging that there is
no such phenomenon to know, only Germans, French, and
so on, ensconced in communitarian traditions of language,
practice, and soil? One moves beyond conventional knowl-
edge or “culture” to notions of universal human knowledge
or “science” and the “civilization” that might inscribe itself
by virtue of such knowledge (Rapport 2011, 2012a).
This article intends to revisit the Wittgensteinian assump-
tions concerning the limitations of language-games and forms
of life by setting them against assumptions, in particular, of
Max Stirner and of Emmanuel Levinas. While in many ways
disparate, the writings of Stirner on the ego and the writings
of Levinas on the other, or alter, both insist that knowledge
can be derived—knowledge, indeed, of a fundamental, even
absolute, nature—by way of a transcending of a taken-for-
granted symbolic, conceptual, textual, and doctrinal language-
world. In Levinas’s words,
What moves outside the order of things can be brought into
the general picture without having recourse to any super-
natural or miraculous dimension and, demanding an ap-
proach irreducible to the established precedents, can autho-
rise proper projects and models to which every mind, that
is to say reason, can none the less gain access. (1989:278)
What is key is in the attention one pays to corporeality: to the
“ﬂesh andmind” of the self (Stirner), to the “body and face” of
the other (Levinas). There is a kind of human organ of per-
ception; it is in the possession of “Anyone,” any individual
human being: attending to this organ and its perceptions can
give onto an awareness of universal humanity. Indeed, we
already know this to be the case. What is the premise of an-
thropological ﬁeldwork but an encounter with a corporeal
being-in-the-world that transcends the taken-for-granted or
enculturated (see Benson and O’Neill 2007)?
The nub of the issue is a human being whose capacity,
whose identity, and whose knowledge exceed the bounds of
any particular collective, “cultural” system of symbolization,
classiﬁcation, and representation: human being in itself. The
issue is (and has been) at once ontological and moral (“The
goal of the human sciences is not to constitute man but
to dissolve him” [Lévi-Strauss 1966:247]). A humanistic ap-
proach not only recognizes in the language-speaker and the
culture-member the social being so designated and “pro-
duced” but also recognizes that there is more to conscious
and self-conscious individuality than cultural construals of
personhood. Albeit much of life might concern a habitual
round—routine exchanges conducted by way of conven-
tional forms and “common sense”—such habitualism re-
mains a temptation rather than a necessary condition. Hab-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORport 2002), and this agency includes the capacity—indeed,
necessity—to gain a knowledge of the real world through
bodily mechanisms and by virtue of an individual, “bone-
bound” being.
Beyond Immersion in a Common Form of Life
I have come to feel that the metaphor of immersion to de-
scribe our human practice is misleading. The anthropologist
is commonly said to immerse himself or herself in the ﬁeld
setting and there ﬁnd the research subjects, immersed alike
in a culture or an environment or a social structure or a lan-
guage, in a set of relations or a ﬁeld of environing forces or
a habitus or a discourse or an episteme or a structural class.
But this is a metaphorical construct, and also a metaphysical
one with overtones of encompassment and totalism, of the
determining conditions of being, and I would contest its ap-
propriateness and accuracy. The only thing I know I am
immersed in is my experience. I occupy a life-world com-
prising consciousness and embodiment. There are my wak-
ing thoughts and sensations and my dreams; there are my
memories and my imaginings; there is my intentionality and
my reactivity. My life-world is a kind of bubble: my body
plus the cocoon of habits and relations that I develop around
it, extending my intentionality into the surrounding space,
so that my body and its environment come ideally to be a
reﬂection of mind—so that environment comes to represent
an extension of the self, a manifestation of the existential
power of the individual living organism (Rapport 2003:215–
239). In short, the human being is immersed in his or her
life-world. And that is all.
So what lies beyond immersion? For while knowing my
immersion in my own experience, I also recognize limits to
my life-world and a radical otherness beyond. I know that
my maintaining my life-world in a kind of homeostasis—
where my worldviews and my life-projects fulﬁll themselves
in the successful deliverance of my expectations and desires—
entails a continuous work against the resistance of a world
beyond. I do not wish to open myself up to charges of atom-
ism, then, powerfully critiqued by Alfred Whitehead (1964:91)
as “the misconception that has haunted philosophical litera-
ture throughout the centuries.” There is “no such mode of
existence” as “independent existence,” Whitehead elaborated,
and “nature [is no] mere aggregate of independent entities,
each capable of isolation,” whose coming together is “acci-
dental”; to the contrary, “every entity is to be understood in
terms of the way it is interwoven with the rest of the universe”
(1926:141). And yet, contra Whitehead, there does seem to
me a sense in which humanity can be described as a plurality:
an aggregation of conscious, embodied entities whose char-
acteristics—certainly in terms of their qualia, their immedi-
ate lived subjective senses of being-in-the-world—are capable.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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of isolated deﬁnition and indeed must be so deﬁned for rea-
sons that are as ethical as they are ontological. Furthermore,
insofar as one posits free will and contingency and serendip-
folds and grows that compasses its own logics, its own hab-
its, its own ways of doing and being, and its own purposes.
Gregory Bateson referred in this connection to the individ-
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000ity, the coming together of these embodied entities in space
does possess an accidental character. (By what law of necessity
do I choose to type these words into my computer at this
moment—looking up as I do so now, midsentence, at a robin
eating seeds from a bird feeder that I have erected outside my
study window—and do you happen to read them?) While not
isolated or independent, the life-worlds of different human
beings abut one another with consequences that are unpre-
dictable, not determinate.
I have in the past suggested that anthropology might con-
ceive of itself as the study of “the effects that human beings
as individual, energetic things-in-the-world have upon one
another” (Rapport 2003:75). My image is based on the in-
sight that a respect for the individual case goes to the very
heart of social science as a project. Each human being rep-
resents an individual center of energy, driven by its own me-
tabolism, within its own embodiment, along its own histor-
ical course of activity-in-the-world. How each will react to
other things in the world, human and nonhuman, has an
indeterminate quality. More speciﬁcally, it is difﬁcult, if not
impossible, to predict how one human being will affect an-
other human being with whom he or she comes into contact.
This is so for three reasons: ﬁrst, because each engages with
others from the position of outsider: each is dependent on
bodily sense-making apparatuses that are discrete and dis-
tinctive to itself, which imbue it with its own perspective on
the world and no other; second, because each is set on its
own life-course, each is engaged in furthering a life-world
whose direction and logic has been distinct from the moment
“it” began; and third, because the sense-making procedures
of each are characterized by a creativity—a “randomness”
even (Rapport 2001)—that makes their generation of per-
spectives unpredictable even to themselves.
As discrete centers of energy, individuals begin, from before
birth, to become distinctly themselves: to accrete personal hab-
its and histories, identities. This takes place through activity-
in-the-world, through physical movement, and through in-
tellectual assessment of what the senses relay to be the results
of that movement. Particular sensory apparatuses operat-
ing with particular points of view give rise to personal, en-
vironing “sensoriums” in which individual consciousnesses
dwell, each possessing a “phenomenological subjectivity,” as
James Fernandez (1992:127) has phrased it. Experience is
“anchored” in the body, in its physical movements and its
“endless internal motilities,” and consciousness operates in
what Fernandez would describe as a “pre-linguistic quality
space” (1971:57, 1977:478).
Not only is the energy behind this activity-in-the-world
individually based—embodied—it is also individually di-
rected. From the moment the individual energy source begins
moving in its environment and becoming itself (its selves), a
unique history of embodiment, of worldly engagement, un-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORual “organism-in-its-environment” (1973:426). How, Bateson
asked himself, does this energetic organism come to know?
Its self-direction entails thought processes that are “funda-
mentally stochastic” (Bateson 1980:200). A stochastic pro-
cess, Bateson elaborated (1980:54–57), is where information
is “plucked” from an initial random array. An individual’s
consciousness provides him or her with an apparently endless
supply of imagined ideational possibilities; from these ran-
dom “nothings” or “no-things,” the individual human brain
makes “somethings” by selecting possible versions (of world)
that might be accurate, useful, pleasurable, and so on, and
testing these out. The criteria of selection are intrinsically
“aesthetic” ones, Bateson insisted: deriving from the eye (and
sensorial complex) of the perceiver, it is a matter of ﬁnding
connecting patterns that gratify. The discovery of a gratifying
pattern leads to new “information,” causing “something” to
survive longer than other random options. What is to be in-
sisted on, Bateson concluded, is that this process of knowing
is both perspectival (personal) and self-directed: a matter not
of environmental or exterior determination but of individ-
ual explorations in the sphere of the random “mutations” of
imagined possibilities. The well-being of the organism (as
with the human species as a whole) is a measure of the extent
to which the information that the individual ﬁnds gratiﬁ-
catory is also in reasonable (and rational) accord with the real
world surrounding it.
The individual organism-plus-environment is not alone in
the world, then. It is discrete but not alone. It embarks on a
distinct voyage of activity-in-the-world (activity-in-its-world)
and sense-making, but it is surrounded by a plurality of other
things-in-the-world, inorganic and organic, some engaged in
voyages comparable to its own. In considering anthropolog-
ical knowing in a pretextual or nontextual way—a way that
sees beyond metaphors of cultural totalism and discursive
determinism—it is the need theoretically to give an account
of plurality that I wish to focus on in greater detail. “What
deﬁnes the human condition,” in Michael Jackson’s words
(2008:230), is the fact that “everyone is both identical and
different. . . . While every human being belongs to the same
species, everyone is irreducibly himself or herself. . . . Our
humanity is both shared and singular.” How does one know
this sharedness next to this singularity, this sameness next
to this difference? In its consciousness the individual is gra-
tuitously itself and discrete, and yet beyond its life-world ex-
ists an otherness that offers resistance, part of which can
be designated as “human” for the particular way in which it
“resists,” the particular way in which it abuts the individual.
At least, this would be my claim: that the individual human
being is able to recognize a commensurateness in fellow hu-
man beings at the same time as these fellows are immersed
in other life-worlds and hence possess a radical distinctive-
ness. This recognition of sameness and difference goes beyond.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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cultural conceptualization and classiﬁcation. But to where
exactly? An “organ of perception”? And is it not a paradoxical
recognition? One recognizes the limits of one’s self and one’s
cible. Outside forces can be friendly or unfriendly to an in-
dividual’s natural force, but they can neither create nor dis-
solve this force. There exists an indomitable egoism that can
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015life-world and the radical difference beyond. One knows that
one is ignorant, moreover, of the intrinsic nature of that plu-
rality that is other.
This paradoxical relation—of knowing that one does not
know, and cannot—calls for further elucidation.
The Mystery of Plurality
In the work of two otherwise very distinct thinkers, knowl-
edge and otherness—the paradox of knowing that there are
limits to what can be known of fellow humans—is developed
into an entire philosophical system that spans the ontolog-
ical and the moral. They are Max Stirner and Emmanuel
Levinas. I shall refer to them, brieﬂy, in turn.
Max Stirner is best known for a text written in 1844, The
Ego and His Own: The Case of the Individual against Au-
thority. The book is a most original polemic, seen as com-
plementing (and preﬁguring) in many ways the existentialist
programs of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Stirner launches
himself into his text from the start, and so shall I. “My ﬂesh
is not their ﬂesh,” he writes (2005:138–139), “my mind is not
their mind. If you bring them under the generalities ‘ﬂesh,
mind,’ those are your thoughts which have nothing to do
with my ﬂesh, my mind, and can least of all issue a ‘call’ to
mine.” He elaborates: “truth,” “freedom,” “justice,” “human-
ity,” “God”—these concepts and all others desire that the
individual grows enthusiastic and serves them. The concepts,
one might say, are egoists. But no: the individual should re-
sist and be the egoist him or herself. “Let me then likewise
concern myself for myself,. . .who am my all, who am the only
one. . . . I am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which
I myself, as creator, create everything” (Stirner 2005:5). Ev-
eryone remains “exclusive” in their individuality, incompa-
rably unique, and what purports to have general meaning—
the “divine,” the “human,” the “true,” the “good,” the “just,”
the “free,” whatever—should by rights—both ontologically
and morally—be seen as without meaning for the individual
as unique ego.
I am most interested here not in Stirner’s arguments for
individuality but in his claims that conceptualization and its
symbolic, textual forms are “foreign” to the subject-as-ego.
The individual develops itself not as a man but as an ego,
Stirner explains. As unique, with nothing in common with
the other and no means of comparison, the ego is the mea-
sure of all things: no concept or name can express or exhaust
it. The ego should always recognize itself as such: recognize
no “calling” as a vessel of God or king or even as a tool of the
idea of humanity. An individual has no need of a calling—of
having exterior ideas stamped into him—to complete him-
self. A man just has to apply his own force to the world, to
act and be himself. Essence is not a task or a concept to be
realized: it just is; it acts; it manifests itself, intrepid, invin-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORneither be trained nor extirpated.
Nevertheless, no one is born alone, and society is a human
being’s original state. The project is for the individual to keep
his “ownness” from societal control: not to lose oneself in
the depths of objects, in what has been declared fundamental
by prior human judgement: sacred specters! The difﬁculty
is that “the confusion of concepts marches ever forwards”
(Stirner 2005:96). Even liberalism exhibits a zealotry with re-
gard to its own ruling concepts—“human,” “science,” “mind,”
“reason”—such that the democratic state comes to be reiﬁed
according to a common norm of good citizenship. Even
liberal “freedom” is a collectivity over against the individual,
who is liable to become dishonored before its sanctity. Even
“human rights” are further foreign law: ego’s “rightness” is
not something that another can make out—however good
his or her intentions. For ego is always more than any par-
ticular historical conceptualization: “Those are all ideas, but
you are corporeal” (Stirner 2005:126). Ego is real and of itself
“a world’s history” (Stirner 2005:365). Concepts, ideas, and
principles are creatures that ego can create. But one does not
allow them to appear ﬁxed and to hold dominion, nor to run
away from us as if their own ﬂesh, nor to become revered as
if our idols. Concepts become “higher powers” and sovereign
only to the extent that ego disrespects itself and abases itself
before them.
The genius of ego, its creativity, is rightly to transcend all
normativity. One might enter into contract with concept and
norm but never to the extent that one misrecognizes one’s
ownness. One puts language to use, as one’s own property—
and does not allow the usage of another to threaten or be-
come despotic. For Stirner, the conceptual cannot know ego,
and even one’s own past linguistic creation should not stand
in the way of what one’s genius deems true and necessary in
the present.
Emmanuel Levinas needs little introduction, for the con-
temporary inﬂuence he exerts. Yet while also writing con-
temporaneously with Wittgenstein and having been a stu-
dent of Husserl and Heidegger, he signiﬁcantly rejects the
notion of a totalizing perspective on meaning in human
life. Culture, history, concept, and landscape as containers of
knowledge and mediators of knowledge are mythic, not true.
There is a “not-knowing” that is essential, fundamental. Ar-
chetypically, this appears to us in death. Death is an event
that happens to us without our having any possibility of a
priori knowledge. It is absolutely other and with an other-
ness that we can never transcend: death remains unknow-
able. This otherness of death is alienating, dislodging us from
the center of existence, sundering our solitude. Death shows
us that “existence is pluralist” (Levinas 1989:43) and that
there is no commonality. There is no possibility of com-
munion with death, or sympathy or harmony or empathy.
Rather, death’s hold over our existence is mysterious..205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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In his boldest move, Levinas asserts that ego’s relationship
with alter, with the living other, is equally “a relationship
with a Mystery” (1989:43). Just as there is an abyss between
of truth, philosophy must “aspire” to the other, to life, and
not to the politics of identity. Our reason should enable us
to avoid “doctrine” in our thought, to mistrust opinion, and
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000the present and death, so there is an abyss between indi-
vidual consciousness and others with whom the individual is
faced. Social life is not reciprocity, then, and intersubjective
space is not a concurrence. Rather, ego’s face-to-face relation
with the other has an exteriority that is irreducible. Other
people are absolutely other: intimations of inﬁnity. They are
beyond knowledge or thought about the being of things: be-
yond totalization, comprehension, or expression. “The re-
lationship with otherness is neither spatial nor conceptual”
(Levinas 1989:48).
The mystery of the other that cannot be known, imagined,
or possessed and that proves the plurality of existence places
the ego under an obligation, according to Levinas, turns ego
into a kind of hostage to ignorance. One thought one knew,
one thought the world stretched out from one’s point of vi-
sion, as good and bad, positive and negative, pleasurable and
distasteful, but now all one’s conceptualization and classiﬁ-
cation have proved relative in the face of the other’s absolute
difference. This radical realization must now, therefore, be
the basis of a new metaphysics in which ethics precedes on-
tology, in which the face of the other and an allowance for
the other’s mysterious being undercuts and undergirds all
claims to know and all practice.
Rather than Levinas’s ethical philosophy per se, it is his
stance on knowledge that I would here say a little more
about, albeit the two cannot be extricated, Levinas insisted
(which is why Heidegger cannot be forgiven for his quietude
in regard to Nazism). Modern technology is feared for re-
ducing men to cogs, Levinas begins. But technology is less
dangerous than the sentimentalism of place and its supposed
environmental totalism that reduces men to rootedness and
splits them into natives and strangers. Technology has the
capacity to wrench us out of a Heideggerian world and its
spiritualism and superstitions: the sublimated idols of place,
family, tribe, and nation. “From this point on, an opportu-
nity appears to us: to perceive men outside the situation in
which they are placed, and let the human face shine in all its
nudity” (Levinas 1990:233). “Beyond situation” lies the “de-
mystiﬁed and disenchanted world” of absolute, homoge-
neous, geometric space. Technology assists us in rooting our
piety not in landscapes and memories but in an abstract
universalism and so to “discover man” and his place in the
“economy of the Real”: freed from imagination and passion,
from “the prestige of myths, the discord they introduce into
ideas and the cruelty they perpetuate in social customs” (Le-
vinas 1990:273).
“Mythic knowledge” is a kind that names and classiﬁes,
seizing hold of its object and possessing it in denial of the
independence of its being. Mythic possession is a kind of
violence that denies otherness: violence is a kind of unjust
sovereignty, an imposition of solitude. The point of philos-
ophy must be not to philosophize in a mythic way. As a loveThis content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORso to aspire to universal truth. Reason—archetypically the
mathematician who bows before the evidence—is the su-
preme freedom of maintaining an inner link with truth.
Freedom is interiorizing rational relations with the world.
“Herald a man freed from myths” and a civilization “built on
justice [that] unfolds in science” (Levinas 1990:276, 275).
Such knowledge begins on the path that leads from a
human being to his or her neighbor. The ego as a solitary
being is a naïve, wild growth and movement. It invades the
world, grabbing nourishment for itself. It is a usurper. But
then the event of meeting otherness opens up the possibility
of fundamental, objective experience: the experience of ex-
ternal being. This experience lays new foundations to the
condition of self-consciousness that are equally and at once
ontological and moral. “When I really stare, with a straight-
forwardness devoid of trickery or evasion, into [the other’s]
unguarded, absolutely unprotected eyes,” the freedom of ego’s
own consciousness, its happy spontaneity, is inhibited (Le-
vinas 1990:293). For the other cannot be adapted to the scale
of ego’s existence without violence, war, or bureaucracy. This
is a kind of knowledge that is not self-knowledge—knowl-
edge from one’s own doctrines and qualities—but “heter-
onomy through and through.” Moreover, it is a knowledge
of physical proximity: a sensibility. Levinas (1989:92, 164)
speaks of the encounter with the other as a kind of “passion”
and “surplus” and “anarchy”: one’s sensibility is affected in
spite of itself. Proximity is anarchic inasmuch as it entails “a
relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any
principle, any ideality” (Levinas 1989:90). One encounters
an otherness independent of any a priori and incommensu-
rable with such.
Notwithstanding, the experience of the other’s proximity
can be appreciated as “the ﬁrst intelligible”: an objectivity
“before cultures and their alluvions and allusions” and inde-
pendent of history (Levinas 1990:294–295). Resisting mythic
possession, the face opens up a new dimension in the per-
ception of being, an absolute one. “The face is an irreducible
mode in which being can present itself in its identity”: en-
closed in its form but also open, establishing itself in its
depth, otherness presents itself somehow in a personal way
and establishes the universal (Levinas 1990:8). The solipsis-
tic, mythic self, captivated by itself, thus ends here in a con-
fronting of other selves. Civilization is conversation with the
other as interlocutor: conversation is commerce, renouncing
the claim to sovereignty of culture.
In Stirner’s ego and in Levinas’s alter I ﬁnd alike a respect
for—even awe before—the ﬁnite human body. The ﬂesh and
mind of the self are the measure of all, attests Stirner, taking
the corporeal perspective of the ego-in-its-life-world; the
body and face of the other are absolute mystery, attests Le-
vinas, taking the corporeal perspective of one life-world vis-
à-vis another. For Stirner and for Levinas, the mystery of the.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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consciousness behind the face, as with the uniqueness of
creativity within ego, situates body beyond conceptualization
and transcendent of doctrine, beyond culture and transcen-
as opposed to a “pure,” rationality. What he discovers is a
materiality against which he rebounds. Johnson cannot kick
through the stone, and Boswell observes this, too. The stone
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Equally, ignorance plays a central role. For Levinas, re-
spect for otherness is based on ignorance more than on
knowledge: the relevance of ignorance is that it undermines
not only myth and the conceptual and cultural but also the
possibility of having other than an intimation of the absolute
plurality of existence. For Stirner, respect for self is based on
a recognition of how foreign the rest of the world is, how
ignorant of ego: the ignorance is absolute and determines the
irrelevancy, both ontological and moral, of otherness to self.
The image of anthropology as a study of the effects that hu-
man beings as individual, energetic things-in-the-world have
on one another ﬁnds echoes in them both: it is the energy of
ego vis-à-vis alter and the energy of alter vis-à-vis ego.
Organ of Perception
We have heard Levinas claim that otherness is experienced
as an event, not a conceptualization or an interpretation, not
a contextualization or a cultural knowing, because the ex-
perience transcends these, with intimations of the absolute.
We are able to approach this absolute, nevertheless, and ap-
preciate the event of otherness because we perceive differ-
ence when we are face to face with it: difference is the way
in which the individual human being experiences the abut-
ting of another against itself and experiences “the miracle
of moving out of oneself” (Levinas 1990:9). But still, how is
this known to be a human abutting? It must be that ego per-
ceives that the way in which the other abuts himself or her-
self is commensurate with the way he or she abuts it. Levinas
therefore emphasizes the nakedness involved: one stares na-
kedly, without evasion or deceit, into a face naked of the
protection of “mythic” identity, role, relationality, even mood
and expression. Here is a perception of naked humanity. But
how, exactly?
Let me return to the image of energetic things-in-the-
world by way of another image. There is a famous passage in
James Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson in which Boswell
describes the two of them, in 1763, discussing the idealist
philosophy of Bishop Berkeley while walking in a church-
yard. It is not the case, Johnson claims, that “to be is to be
perceived” (esse est percipi), as Berkeley would have it: a real
world exists independent of our constructions of it. And to
show the vehemence of his disagreement Johnson kicks out
vigorously at a large stone lying nearby until, Boswell recalls,
his foot “rebounded from it” and Johnson exclaims: ‘I refute
it thus’ ” (Boswell 1935:471). Johnson’s so-called commonsen-
sical proof for the independent existence of matter is not
widely regarded as logically competent to refute immateri-
alism; nevertheless, the image is useful here. For Johnson is
claiming to know the reality of the world through physical
engagement rather than an a priori discursivity: a practical,This content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORpossesses a mass and inertia that can force themselves on
Johnson’s and Boswell’s consciousness. It cannot force a spe-
ciﬁc perception or interpretation—there is no saying what
Johnson’s and Boswell’s “inside views” on the stone are—but
it is difﬁcult for them not to accept the stone’s otherness and
objectivity. This is something both of them perceive.
Now let me ask this: In what ways are Johnson’s and
Boswell’s relations to each other distinct from their individ-
ual relations to the stone? How are Johnson and Boswell dif-
ferent to each other from stones? If Johnson kicked Boswell
instead of the stone, he might ﬁnd himself kicked back. In
addition, Boswell could arrange with Johnson future times
and places at which he agreed to be kicked again. Further-
more, Johnson and Boswell could engage in discussion on
their kicking relations and develop norms in relation to
them. They could equally discuss histories of the incidences
of kicking and the proprieties of kicking. None of this would
assure Johnson or Boswell knowledge of what it felt like to
the other to kick or be kicked or of their motivations or pur-
poses for doing so beyond what was openly claimed and
symbolically framed. Moreover, the fact that both are seem-
ingly “immersed” in a discursive world of “stones” and “kicks”
and “times and places” and “discussions” and the “proprie-
ties” of stones and kicks does no more than provide a con-
text of surfaces on which their interaction might conveniently
skate (Rapport 1993); these are symbolic and conceptual
tools—precisely a form of life, formal tools and settings to
use in the construction of personal experience.
Beneath the symbolic, conceptual, and social surface, what,
then, do Johnson and Boswell ﬁnd? Johnson rebounds off
Boswell similarly to kicking the stone: Boswell has materi-
ality. But Boswell can also arrange to move himself to other
scheduled locations for Johnson to kick and rebound off him
again. And Johnson and Boswell can engage in the commerce
of seeking to convey their thoughts and feelings on the en-
counters and report on what other acquaintances also pur-
port to be thinking and feeling about their encounters. But
is there more? Each might know his own pain or pleasure.
Each is, in Stirner’s terms, assured of his own “ownness.” But
what of the other? This is, in Levinas’s terms, a “mystery”:
what appears before them, one might say, is a stone-likeness
attached to an intentionality or a stone-likeness attached to
an autonomy: Johnson can kick Boswell-as-a-stone but ﬁnds
Boswell also possessed of the energy to kick back or ﬂee or
complain or deliberate or decide to return to be kicked rou-
tinely. This mystery sunders the solitude of Johnson’s in-
tentionality. Johnson looks at Boswell, and Boswell can look
back. Indeed, Boswell can continually orient himself toward
Johnson, physically and verbally, until Johnson kicks him
with sufﬁcient force as to disable him or kill him.
Is there a nontextual knowledge here? There is a speciﬁcity
to the otherness that Johnson and Boswell ﬁnd in each other.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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that is distinct from the otherness of a stone—namely, each
other’s autonomy—and distinct, also, from the otherness of
a pet animal—namely, each other’s capacity to make abstract
underwritten by universal human capacities and can deliver
universal human truths. One can conﬁgure the human be-
yond the cultural, the historical and social contingencies of
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000verbal arrangements—and distinct, again, from the other-
ness of artiﬁcial intelligence—namely, each other’s incapac-
ity to be refashioned once sufﬁciently disabled. Let us call
this recognition of a distinctive otherness “humanity.” John-
son and Boswell can recognize in each other an otherness
that possesses human capacities. The claim of this article is
that such recognition of an autonomous, capable human ac-
tor is itself a universal human capacity: we have the percep-
tual capability of recognizing universally a humanity that
is distinct from thinghood and from animality and from
technology. We do not know the qualia of the human other,
but we can recognize its humanity in its capacity to act as
our interlocutor in particular, signiﬁcant ways.
The uniqueness and the mystery of human corporeality
are together the object that anthropology conﬁgures when it
pursues a knowledge that is pretextual or supratextual. This
pursuit is possible, one can claim, by virtue of a kind of
universal human organ of perception that operates in this
nontextual sphere and exercises a capacity to rationalize rec-
ognition of fellow human interlocutors. An organ of human
perception enables ego to know alter as a commensurate
presence that is external to itself and that exists beyond cul-
tural conceptions of identity and their symbolic representa-
tions and classiﬁcations.
From Existential Ignorance
to Scientiﬁc Knowledge?I am aware of an apparent contradiction. Stirner and Levinas
have written of an ignorance in relations between ego and
the other that is absolute: it leads Stirner to respect ego as the
measure of all and Levinas, equally, to respect the other. And
yet I have concluded by positing a kind of universal human
capacity for knowledge that might be urged on anthropology
as a pretextual and supracultural methodology. Moreover, I
have given this knowledge linguistic, conceptual, and cul-
tural characteristics, seemingly, and have spoken about hu-
manity’s “capacities” and “intentionality” and the way these
might distinguish them from “stones,” “animals,” and “com-
puters” in interlocutory relations.
The contradiction has, I believe, a processual solution. Ig-
norance, one might say, is an existential and moral imper-
ative: “It is my duty to recognize my ignorance of the other”;
“It is my duty to recognize the other’s ignorance of myself.”
This duty, however, can be pursued further: it manifests it-
self in the “naked” look into the eyes of another, but it need
not end there. With the sundering of one’s solitude one may
begin the process of living beyond solipsism and also of
making sense and knowing beyond solipsism: “What is the
nature of the speciﬁc resistances that I experience in my life-
world?” The claim of this article is that such a knowing isThis content downloaded from 138.251.162
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and the machine.
But then, this is also for us to ﬁnd ourselves as anthropol-
ogists where we began and, if not to know it for the ﬁrst time,
then to know it afresh after a disciplinary detour through
relativism. I mean that ethnographic practice has essentially
attempted the putting aside of preconceptions—deployed
the naked look—and the meeting of informants as fellow
individual bodies into whose skin and into whose life-world
one imagines stepping. There is no barrier here—cultural,
conceptual, ideological—besides embodiment. This repre-
sents an absolute barrier in terms of the substance of an-
other individual human life, but a surmountable barrier in
terms of the capacities of the universal human body and its
nature (Rapport 2010). Hence, the consummation of eth-
nographic practice and its nontextual knowing becomes an
attempt to establish a language of anthropological insight
(conceptualization, classiﬁcation, causation) that is scientiﬁc
rather than mythic—whose notions of ontology and analysis
are removed from those of folk models—and that aims to
know what might be the capacities of universal humanity
even as it respects the mystery of how particular individuals
substantiate that humanity (as qualia). Stirner’s and Levinas’s
texts would appear to be of this kind, and mine, too: an in-
scription of the nontextual. Just as Levinas celebrated the
technological developments that helped remove conscious-
ness from a mythic, folk world and increase opportunity
to perceive the naked human face, so a technical language
might house the development of anthropology’s appreciation
of human capacities for perception—such as the corporeal
human knowledge that in the body of the human other re-
side an autonomy, a symbolic facility, and a corporeal fra-
gility and ﬁnitude commensurate with its own.
Key to this scientiﬁc project is the understanding of lan-
guage with which anthropology equips itself: what linguistic
“membership” is seen to entail and what the use of language
offers. The anthropological tendency has been to approach
language as a kind of prejudice—partisan and predisposi-
tional—whose world-making (and world-limiting) effects
include the incorporating and interpellating of speaker-
members as in a text:
Human beings . . . are very much at the mercy of the par-
ticular language which has become the medium of ex-
pression for their society. . . . The fact of the matter is that
the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously built
upon the language habits of the group. . . . The worlds in
which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely
the same world with different labels attached. . . . We see
and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do
because the language habits of our community predispose
certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir 1956:69).205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
 Terms and Conditions
The conception is of a closed ideological structure, even a
prison-house, whose lexicon, grammar, and taxonomy of con-
ceptual classes deﬁne, frame, and canalize—in a word, tex-
An essential insight in these alternative versions of lan-
guage—and an emancipatory one—concerns the nature of
linguistic competency. Routine social exchange by way of a
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015tualize—the life that is thought, felt, lived, and expressed
within it. Such an understanding becomes pervasive in so-
ciocultural anthropology by way of the inﬂuential presence
of structuralist theorists (Saussure, Durkheim and Mauss,
Lévi-Strauss) and the inﬂuential appropriation of Heidegger-
ian ideas in later French poststructuralist theory: “Language
speaks, not man. Man speaks only insofar as he artfully
complies with language” (Heidegger 1971:73); “Language is
the house of Being in which man exists by dwelling” (Hei-
degger 1993:237). This becomes, in its trenchant Foucaul-
dian form,
The researches of psychoanalysis, of linguistics, of an-
thropology have “decentered” the subject in relation to the
laws of its desire, the forms of its language, the rules of its
actions, or the play of its mythical and imaginative dis-
courses. (Foucault 1972:22)
But one might espouse alternative conceptions to language
being a coercive instrument of cultural determination and
dominion. Georg Simmel (1971), then, drew a sharp dis-
tinction between the forms of a language and the contents
imputed to those forms: to consume a language as a speaker-
hearer was to animate it with one’s own personality. For Roy
Harris (1981), language was in continuous creation, and also
improvisation, by speakers immersed in their own varied ex-
periences; it was a myth to conceptualize a “linguistic com-
munity” as assuming a stable sovereignty, an integration, and
a regimented, mechanical uniformity. Rather than collective
properties, consider a living language as the momentary in-
teractions of individual purpose—practical and ephemeral,
rational, innovative, and inconsistent. Or again, George Steiner
(1975) urged a recognition of language as exhibiting a dual
phenomenology: a conventional and public surface, as against
personal and private depths. Beneath a common surface of
speech forms and notations, of grammar and phonology, ﬂow
the speaker-hearers’ articulate consciousnesses and their in-
dividual idiolects. Hence,
the language of a community, however uniform its social
contour, is an inexhaustibly multiple aggregate of speech-
atoms, of ﬁnally irreducible personal meanings. (Steiner
1975:46)
It is personal meanings that support the continuing collective
exchange: they are its roots, and they derive from the singu-
lar speciﬁcity of individual speaker-hearers’ somatic and psy-
chological identities. Any conception of normal or standard
idioms—of linguistic homogeneity—is a ﬁction, part of a po-
litical rhetoric: “grammatical rules” can amount to only ap-
proximate and unstable summaries of the regularities of ac-
tual speech (Steiner 1975:173, 204).This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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lived—felt, interpreted, intended—within it, nor does it guar-
antee the knowledge derived. Symbols do not carry their
meanings on their backs (as Wittgenstein also came to rec-
ognize), and to partake in a verbal, a conceptual, even a be-
havioral exchange is to share precisely in a form of life but
not necessarily (or likely) in its contents. Meaning is a per-
sonal and private project. As Sapir (1956:153) also admitted,
it is in the nature of the “friendly ambiguities” of linguistic
forms that an individuation of interpretation takes place in
the moment of those forms being superﬁcially shared. Com-
petent speaker-hearers exchange common forms in conven-
tional ways in public spaces, but what they come to know,
and why, derives from the gratuitousness—the radical is-
ness and I-ness—of interior, bonebound identities (Rapport
2008a). And ethnography bears this out. The meanings con-
strued and the worldviews inhabited within a language com-
munity, even a small, apparently coherent community, far
from assuming a determinate and homogeneous proﬁle, may
comprise an aggregation of diversity and idiosyncrasy (Briggs
1992; Cohen 1987; Devereux 1978; Rapport 1993; Schwartz
1978; Szwed 1966; Wallace 1964).
The slippage or ambiguity that characterizes the relation
between form and meaning in symbolic languages offers
anthropology a methodology as well as a research question.
Certainly, research questions present themselves—How does
an individual human being come to know? What in the way
of an organ of perception capacitates the knowing human
body independently from the particular symbolic forms of
its expression?—but the free play of language—the nature of
language as appropriatable and improvisatorial—also affords
a space for inventing a scientiﬁc methodology of representa-
tion. It gives anthropology after Levinas and Stirner a char-
acteristic shape: anthropology moves ideally from a position
of solipsism—being at home in a particular, situated, con-
ventional language—through a pretextual, nonconventional,
acultural knowing—meeting the human other in the ﬁeld—
to an emergent technical textualization. This movement
might be dubbed one from “culture” to “civilization” and a
cosmopolitan emancipation (Rapport 2012b).
Two linguistic ventures come into play here. First, there is
a scientiﬁc one; but there is also an aesthetic one, equally
technical, by which the human others met in the ﬁeld—the
energetic things-in-the-world that look back at one—are
borne witness to without “enculturation,” without incorpora-
tion or mythologization. An anthropological knowing com-
prises the progressive understanding of a universal human
condition—a scientiﬁc discernment of human capacities—
alongside a duty of distance and of ignorance concerning
the substance of other individual human lives. One writes
an aesthetic account of the event of meeting an individual
otherness, as it seemed to oneself, at the same time as one is.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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self-conscious regarding the ﬁctional nature of one’s text.
Anthropology does justice to the “passion,” the “anarchy” of
the event of otherness without presuming to transcend or
rience of the otherness of the world occasions me to rec-
ognize his otherness. He is, he tells me, “a wild child, with a
heart of gold.” (His reputation among the other porters, more
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000reduce its mystery.
Coda: Roger WeirI conducted my most recent ﬁeld research by working for a
Commentsyear as a porter (or orderly) in a large state-funded teaching
hospital in eastern Scotland (Rapport 2008b). Roger Weir
became a regular interlocutor of mine. We had begun on the
same day and had undergone the same induction procedure.
Roger was some 20 years my junior at the time (in his early
20s), but I would match my insinuation into the institu-
tionalism and hierarchy of the hospital against his. Timing
our lunch breaks to coincide, we would sit together in a cor-
ner of the staff dining room, compare sandwiches, and dis-
cuss love lives while also comparing notes on our recent por-
tering experience.
Roger was born 3 months prematurely, he informed me
shortly after our ﬁrst meeting. The tendons in his legs were
too short, and that is why he still walked rather as if he were
cross-country skiing: as if he were sliding across surfaces,
knees bent and heels splayed out. He took up karate to
stretch his tendons, and he has kept it up now for 8 years,
three times a week. Not that that has helped his poor co-
ordination—or his dyslexia, for that matter. His other great
love is his music, he informs me: Black Sabbath and Ozzy
Osbourne, to be precise. His feet will always mean that he
has a partial disability in karate, but in music—writing songs
and singing them in his band—there are no limits. He has no
limits: “Keep on rocking, Nigel.”
While I remain a front-door porter, Roger is allocated to
the operating theatres, an assignment he comes to hate. It is
boring, it is dirty, and the people working there are ofﬁcious
and do not know the meaning of fun. He has to clear up after
medical operations without proper training, he complains to
me: bloody ﬂoors, bloody clogs. It is as if he were employed
as a domestic. And he could catch a superbug. He is going to
have to start telling his hospital bosses straight what he thinks
of them. (It is not as if his job here were the real thing—as
important as his band, or fun!) Roger repeatedly talks to me
of two escapes: the annual Black Sabbath “Ozzfest” in Milton
Keynes, near London, and a possible karate tour of Japan to
embrace further the manners, spirituality, and most perfect
gentlemanliness of the Japanese masters.
Meanwhile, Roger keeps on at Constance Hospital, deter-
mined to hold his own. He continues to be surprised, too, by
the limits his fellow workers set themselves and would set
him. Why behave as automata? Why be co-opted by the terms
laid down by institutional dicta? Roger seems surprised by
the very discourses of a hospital as a professional space and
the positionalities apparently on offer: alignment and resis-
tance, cooperation and contest. Furthermore, Roger’s expe-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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tation to objectify him—even to the extent of turning him
into a ﬁgure I can easily imagine and for whom descriptive
terms from my own experience are a ready ﬁt (“cross-country
skiing,” “love lives”). The face and body abutting mine do not
so easily give up their mystery.
An abiding image I have in my head is walking beside
Roger down the long and wide public corridors, en route to a
fetching or carrying job. I am in my front-door yellow polo
shirt, with “N. Rapport, Support Services” emblazoned on
the chest; Roger is in his operating-theater greens. We walk
side by side, Roger with his characteristic gait (and me rather
round-shouldered and ﬂat-footed). While we walk Roger in-
sists on playing loud Black Sabbath riffs on his air guitar, to
the bemusement of passers-by; or else he practices his karate
kicks on various of the swing doors and walls and notice-
boards that we pass. I ﬁnd Dr. Johnson and Boswell walking
with us, too; Stirner and Levinas, too.Anne Line Dalsgård
Institute of Culture and Society, Aarhus University, Moesgård Allé
20, Building 4235, room 2.22, 8270 Højbjerg, Denmark (ald@cas
.au.dk). 6 IX 14
I welcome Nigel Rapport’s argument on a nontextual, cul-
turally unaffected sphere of human existence for at least
three reasons.
I have always found Rapport’s insistence on a particularly
human capacity inspiring (as in this article: “to know, again,
as human beings”). The notion of a universal, rational, and
response-able individual, which he defends, is more a ques-
tion than a fact for me, as I also see reasons for a less ﬂatter-
ing notion of the human, one that includes an immense sus-
ceptibility to habit and adaption. But even so, the integrity of
Rapport’s argument is afﬁrming. It seems to be not only about
life in general but also a personal, hopeful quest for a mean-
ingful existence, and if anthropology did not include a striving
to understand one’s own being, I would ﬁnd it a rather bizarre
exercise in its prying examination of others’ lives.
Another reason for welcoming the argument is my own
interest in moments of a different kind of knowing. I once
worked as an actor in a small group theatre, and on the ﬂoor,
especially when practicing, I got to rely on an intelligence
that is not connected to the categorizing, analytical mind. It
is an intelligence that understands complexities much faster
than words can capture, as when you experience the atmo-
sphere of a room change by the physical presence of an in-
coming person. Such moments arise in ﬁeldwork, too, and.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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have been described (especially in works from the mid-1990s
[Csordas 1994; Jackson 1996b]), but despite their relevance
to recent debates on affect and materiality, they seem to have
Paul Wenzel Geissler
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo, Postboks
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015disappeared from our methodological discussions, perhaps
exactly because of their being human. I am not convinced,
however, that such moments of sensibility and recognition of
physical being are beyond culture (though well beyond “the
domain of conventional conceptualization and classiﬁca-
tion”). The interesting question for me as an anthropologist
has always been how culture manifests itself in bodily and
affective responses rather than whether it does so at all.
However, Rapport’s proposal challenges this rather safe an-
thropological position and spurs a need to test it empirically.
Third, I simply welcome the idea of a sphere of knowledge
beyond words for the challenge it poses to academia, namely,
to put that which is nontextual into text or perhaps to ﬁnd
empty spaces for it to exist in the midst our writings. Hans
Ulrich Gumbrecht’s (2004) distinction between textual pres-
ence and meaning is worth considering here, as is the ques-
tion of the form of arguments we produce. Rapport proposes
aesthetic accounts of the event of otherness and its energetic
effect on ego, but I ﬁnd that much still has to be explored in
terms of such descriptions. Can we write about events of
otherness without losing the energy they originally brought
to our reﬂections? Is there a way to keep them intact and
active in description? As much as I really enjoy reading
about Roger in the coda of the article, I also miss the sense of
wonder that Rapport writes about. One could say that won-
der is Rapport’s experience but need not be his reader’s. But
I would not agree; for me, an anthropological argument should
preferably work on more than the analytical level alone. But
again, this of course applies to the question Rapport raises:
“How does an individual human being come to know?”
Reaching this question almost toward the end, the article
ﬁnishes with a puzzle rather than an answer. We may ask
what anthropology is, if a dutiful remembrance of our “ig-
norance concerning the substance of other individual human
lives” is kept at the heart of our endeavor. Or, put differently,
how may we reach “a scientiﬁc discernment of human ca-
pacities,” if the experience of otherness is continually fore-
grounded? How do we as anthropologists come to know? To
me, it seems that we have to move beyond the “awe before
the ﬁnite human body” to interest and relationship, to risk
the respectful distance in order to get close enough to be
touched and disturbed. Walking with Nigel and Roger down
that corridor, I wish to know what Roger asked Nigel about;
how Roger’s otherness affected Nigel; how Nigel tried to test
his impression of Roger by asking, looking, sensing; and what
it feels like to be a bonebound identity. The recognition of
the limits to our subjective life-worlds may be our rescue
from naïve identiﬁcation, or at least allow us to remember
that empathy is just the beginning of a search (Leavitt 1996:
530). But I do not believe in any safe, civilized position to
arrive at. Just human vulnerability.This content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTOR1091, Blindern 0317, Oslo, Norway (p.w.geissler@sai.uio.no).
12 IX 14
Although himself a reader of anthropology, Emmanuel Le-
vinas has as yet found less resonance among anthropologists
than other French thinkers (but see Benson 2008). Rapport
proposes to (re)turn, with Levinas, to an anthropology be-
yond cultural comparison and textual relativism, insisting on
ethnography as “humanist” pursuit, against the idea of onto-
logical or cultural plurality as disciplinary linchpin. “Anthro-
pology through Levinas” takes the radical alterity of the other
human being (rather than the diversity of plural worlds) as
an enigmatic starting point for a “pretextual or nontextual”
ethnographic sensitivity, prior to relativism, culturalism, and
their contemporary guises.
Rapport’s reading mirrors the philosopher’s own turn to
anthropology.Writing on “Lévy-Bruhl and contemporary phi-
losophy” in 1957, Levinas examined our maligned forefa-
ther’s writings on participation in primitive mentality and
his gradual shift from positing the prelogical as cultural trait
to the recognition of universal pretextual or nonrepresenta-
tional modes of human existence. Levinas understands Lévy-
Bruhl’s project as quest for human being “before cultures” (if
possibly more recognizable among certain peoples), search-
ing a “profound reality [that] reveals its existing in dimen-
sions that cannot be deﬁned by any category of representa-
tion, but to which . . . we have direct access albeit through
modes of our existence that are different from theory” (1995
[1957]:60). This echoes Rapport’s quest for fundamental,
even absolute, knowledge and for a return, beyond common
sense and language, “to a place from which we begin to know,
again, as human beings.” Rapport’s trajectory of anthropo-
logical knowledge making—from conventional language,
“through pretextual, nonconventional, acultural knowing,”
to “technical textualization”—resembles Levinas’s call, “not
to return to the primitive articles of faith” (i.e., the practices
and structures that universal experiences have produced in
certain cultures), but to rediscover universal ways of being
by way of attention to the other (1995 [1957]:58).
My own reading of some of Levinas’s writings, while I was
living in an East African village, helped me to think through
relations between oneness and separation, mergedness and
emergence, proximity and alterity, which we later discussed
using Levinas’s term, as matters of “touch” (Prince and
Geissler 2010). From this long-past reading, literally in a
different ﬁeld and guided by different encounters, I have
some questions—ignorant curiosity rather than expert cri-
tique. For one, I wonder whether the opposition of language
(as a “limit of my world”) and what Rapport calls “corpo-
reality” holds or whether such “individual, bonebound be-
ing” is an appropriate rendering of what Levinas speaks of as
“the face,” sometimes “body and face.” When Levinas, for ex-.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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ample, proposes that language is proximity and touch, rather
than mere representation or passing on of knowledge (1999
[1967]), the stark distinction between corporeal and discur-
Andrew Irving
Granada Centre for Visual Anthropology, Department of
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000sive, body and language, is eroded. If language—in his terms
as the “saying” rather than as the said—can touch the other, is
that mainly corporeal?We drew on Levinas to discuss “touch”
as a dimension of ethnographic ﬁeldwork and central to a
particular ontological possibility, but the metaphor of touch
might be misleading in regard to its apparent corporeality.
Levinas speaks of touch and (similar to de Certeau’s “tactil-
ity”) “contact” in the face-to-face with the other, but he posits
this not as opposed to vision, or indeed to language, but rather
as the underlying modality of being, which can take place also
in the regard exchanged with the other, or in words. The point
is that touch as event precedes the relation and the being
of those in touch. Speech and vision can touch, and from
this contingent event, imbued with “tenderness and respon-
sibility” (1999 [1967]:274–275), everything else stems. Rather
than the question of the body, it is the relation of touch to
responsibility, of face to demand—Levinas’s primacy of the
ethical—that orients the argument. “Respect” and “awe,” yes;
but for “the ﬁnite human body?”
This relates to a second question about Rapport’s notion
of humans as “discrete centers of energy.”
Possibly because of my ignorance of Stirner’s work, I
wonder about the compatibility of this anthropology—and
of Stirner’s “ego” outside the normativity of language and
culture—with Levinas’s “destruction of substance” or of “sub-
stantiveness” (1995 [1957]:66) and his critique of phenome-
nological notions of intentionality and intersubjectivity. If
the mystery of plurality consists of the fact that relation pre-
cedes entity, that objects always objectify relations—then
where does the ego free from normativity ﬁt? For Levinas,
the face of the other elicits obligation before being; ethics
precedes ontology. Is this fundamentally passive form of ef-
fect what Rapport aims at when proposing that anthropol-
ogy study “the effects that human beings as individual, en-
ergetic things in the world have upon one another”? Or is
there a tension?
These questions, posed in the spirit of shared curiosity,
reduce in no way the value of Rapport’s call to draw on
Levinas for contemporary anthropology and to explore the
enigma of ﬁeldwork by acknowledging incommensurable
otherness and the contingent possibility of seeing the other
facing him “naked” in Levinas’s sense, as in the coda and
some of the author’s other writings. Emblematic for the role
of contingency—as both unpredictability and proximity—in
ethnographic knowing, is Rapport’s robin, somewhat unex-
pectedly arriving at the window midway through the text
and its writing, eye to eye but beyond mutual control or in-
tention: unpredictable and unﬁxable penetration of the other
(human or nonhuman) into the horizon of representation,
rupturing the bubble of the taken-for-granted, opening a mo-
mentary possibility to know.This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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By asking “What is the nature of the knowing subject, and
what is the nature of the known object?” this article con-
siders the possible forms that thought and action might take
outside of the social and linguistic structures that shape hu-
man subjectivity. “The nub of the issue,” Rapport suggests, is
how a small, bonebound “organism-in-its-environment” with
ﬁnite knowledge about itself, other humans, and the world
can transcend overdetermination by the surrounding soci-
ety or at the hands of anthropologists. Here Rapport strongly
questions the dominant metaphors anthropology uses to the-
orize human subjectivity and asks, What might an anthro-
pological model of human subjectivity look like if it was re-
thought, reassembled, and not seen through conventional
analytical tropes of sociality, relationality, context, habitus,
textuality, and so on? For, as Michael Jackson (1996a) points
out, these are metaphors of analysis and explanation rather
than determining agents, and it is erroneous to confuse the
theoretical abstractions used to explain and analyze human
beings with their experiential reality on the ground.
The concomitant problem, for Rapport, is the mistaken, yet
epistemologically convenient, practice of inferring the con-
tent of people’s thinking and being from the surrounding so-
cial context. Drawing on the existential philosophy of Stir-
ner and Levinas and the ecological anthropology of Bateson,
Rapport argues against anthropological claims to knowledge
that equate human subjectivity with social, cultural, or na-
tional identity to the extent that an individual’s “ﬂesh and
mind” simply become a black box that reﬂects the surround-
ing society. The issue is both ontological and moral in that,
for Rapport, understanding human life rests less on the cir-
cumstances of where a person is born, socializes, works, and
prays or how they are deﬁned and categorized than on the
existential fact of their belonging to the human race. Being
human involves getting by in an uncertain world in which
knowledge is not completely socially constituted and thus can
take radically different forms, leading Rapport to argue for a
disciplinary rethinking whereby other human beings are not
so readily deﬁned, explained, understood, categorized, or lo-
calized through a default recourse to social or cultural forms.
Following Levinas, Rapport outlines a model in which
other persons are irreducible in their alterity and encompass
realms of knowing and being—including what might be de-
scribed as pretextual or nontextual—that exist beyond social,
linguistic, or hermeneutic understanding. Consequently, any
attempt to understand the Other in and of themselves, as
opposed to in terms of a social category, involves a system-
atic distortion wherein their actions, motivations, and world-
view are made comprehensible by translating them into the.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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familiar symbolic forms (social, moral, epistemological, polit-
ical, etc.) of the Same. This effects a type of violence on the
Other that fails to recognize them in their full humanity. As
effects between them. Marcel Mauss’s 1905 work on the
seasonal variations of Inuit life springs to mind. In this in-
credibly creative, epoch-engaging work, Mauss expressed his
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015we cannot fully know other persons, our primary relation is
therefore ethical rather than epistemological. This suggests
a different kind of knowing subject and postulates a type of
awareness and appreciation of other human beings that can-
not be deﬁned in terms of objective rational truth or shared,
hermeneutic understanding but nevertheless offers a basis
for engaging with, learning about, and responding to other
persons. In this model, individuality, uniqueness, and other-
ness are not the opposites of human commonality but the
conditions that bring it into being as people engage with each
other’s emotions, motivations, and actions within the ﬂow of
quotidian activity. Performative action is thus less a script
written by and about others than a mode of improvising and
acting in relation to gaps and breakdowns in knowledge and
comprehension. Action does not involve or imply radical re-
nunciations of preexisting ways of being; instead, it is sufﬁ-
cient to be any activity (purposeful or otherwise) that reveals
the contingency of society and habitual practices. Or, in Sar-
tre’s terms, “the small movement which makes of a totally
conditioned social being someone who does not render back
completely what his conditioning has given him” (1974:45).
This is the province of the small movements of the ﬁnite,
mortal human being who can live in, act in, and imagine the
world otherwise.
In spirit, if not always in practice, it is an activity that is
constituted in the face-to-face encounter. Here the Other—
as preﬁgured byMartin Buber (1958 [1923]) before Levinas—
is referred to not as “he,” “she,” “they,” “working class,”
“elite,” “English,” “African,” “informant,” and so on, but as
“you,” placing them in a second-person position and thereby
mediating the dualism between ﬁrst-person subjectivity and
third-person objectivity. In this reciprocal address of “you,”
grounds for mutual and embodied interaction are established
that allow the possibility for a type of moral awareness and
appreciation that provides a practical basis for engaging with,
learning about, and responding to the experiences of other
human beings in ways that do not reduce them to prescribed,
third-person, categorical identities.
Heonik Kwon
Trinity College, University of Cambridge, Trinity Street, Cam-
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National de la Recherche Scientiﬁque/Ecole des Hautes EtudesSeveral major paradigmatic struggles exist in the history of
modern social anthropology. Looking back on this history,
one notices how important these confrontations have been
in generating creative thoughts within the discipline, as in
other disciplines. One also notices that in anthropology, in
parallel with the development of paradigmatic thinking, in-
ﬂuential scholars have also sought to bring the apparently
opposing streams of ideas together or to generate reciprocalThis content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORpolitical and scholarly interest in the ethnographic reality in
which human beings are both individuals and nonindivid-
uals, where social life can accommodate both the time we are
communalists and the time we become anticommunitarians.
Why did he do that? I think he was keen to bring together
what his mentor and uncle, Émile Durkheim, separated in
The Division of Labor in Society. He was also deeply con-
cerned about the escalating ideological tensions in French
society and, more broadly, in Europe (remember the Dreyfus
affair?). He called the two forms of Inuit socioecological
life the “individualism” of summer and wintertime “commu-
nism.” His later, better-known 1923–1924 work on the mo-
rality of gift exchange has to be read in relation to his earlier
essay on the Inuit. Then, his concept of reciprocity, primarily
associated with his The Gift today, and his efforts to imagine
the horizon of human morals beyond the polarity of gift and
monetary economies, appear with fresh meaning. As some-
one whose research centers around the sociocultural history
of the Cold War and what anthropology can do to broaden
our knowledge of this history, the concept of reciprocity that
emerges from this reading is as liberating as the concept of
liberty (when one feels suffocated by the imperatives of com-
munity) or of solidarity or of fundamental self-and-other re-
latedness (when one feels isolated and unconnected to others).
Ironically, in order to continue this important art of re-
ciprocation or transvaluation, we need to continue to have
paradigmatic things between which we can practice the art.
Individualism and communism were such things for Mauss.
For those of us a century later, there is individuality versus
personhood, as well as many other varieties.
A few days ago, I was having a conversation over tea with
a colleague about his new book ideas. At some point in our
enjoyable conversation, we somehow hit upon the polarity of
the individual and the person. My colleague emphatically
said, “The battle has been won, has it not?” Nigel Rapport’s
new essay is a poignant reminder that this may not be the
case. This battle is not something one side or the other side
can declare a victory in—just like the Cold War. His essay
provides a timely awakening to the fact that the battle
continues and that it has to continue. I doubt there will be an
end game to this, and I hope that there never will be.
James Leachen Sciences Sociales/Université Aix-Marseille), Marseille, France;
and Anthropology and Sociology, University of Western Australia,
35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, West Australia 6009, Australia
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“A man’s head is not a bamboo tube.” The phrase (used by
Nekgini-speaking people of Papua New Guinea in the con-.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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text of sorcery divination) is perhaps worth consideration in
the light of Rapport’s complex, sensitive anthropological proj-
ect. Unlike a bamboo tube (used to hide sorcery materials), a
practice within which this phrase has meaning is that there
are other means to know what is contained within the heads
of men. The other both is and, at crucial moments, is not a
Mark Maguire
Department of Anthropology, National University of Ireland
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000man’s head cannot be split open to reveal its contents. The
thoughts and motivations of others are not available for in-
spection in that manner: a conﬁrmation, it appears, of Rap-
port’s “bonebound island” of individual knowledge. It is worth
consideration because Iwould, inmany other regards, drawon
Nekgini thought and practice to question the image of indi-
vidual and knowledge outlined here.
Nekgini speakers continually make explicit to themselves
the constitution of any human being as the ongoing project
of others. Flesh, for example, is speciﬁcally not “one’s own,”
but the product of speciﬁc other people’s labor and knowl-
edge in growing crops, supplying protein, and undertaking
sentient, directed nurture. To be corporeal is to share in,
borrow, and make use of other’s labor and knowledge mani-
fested in your body being your body, your ﬂesh. And this
extends to thought and knowledge. Knowledge is rarely
claimed to have arisen independently of particular relation-
ships and the powers or work of others. Further, health is
threatened not only by one’s kinsmen’s thoughts and feelings
about the self but also, indeed, by the very unknown aspects
of the self that lie beyond consciousness, emanating as spirit
or ghost.
This is perhaps a predictable response to Rapport’s ar-
guments. It is perhaps too easy, and also not quite in the
same register. And his arguments deserve to be taken seri-
ously. It is, after all, “only” I who is forming these thoughts,
and I am more than aware of their difference from those of
other people. A sense of that reality of difference is made
palpable by their very ﬂeshly existence, clearly discernible as
like and yet other to the self. Rapport makes a powerful (if
complex) moral argument for humanist appreciation of the
value of human exceptionalism through mutual recognition.
His recommendation is that anthropology adopt this, rather
than problematic conceptualizations of shared cultural un-
derstanding, as the focus for ethnographic and philosophical
investigation.
Accepting the problems with “culture,” his text made me
reﬂect in a challenging way on my relationships with my
friends among Nekgini speakers and, indeed, my own family.
“This paradoxical relation—of knowing that one does not
know, and cannot—calls for further elucidation.” But as Nek-
gini practice suggests, the paradox extends to knowing that
one does not really know self. There is a mystery there as
well. As Kohn puts it, “We can never really know what other
selves—human or nonhuman—are ‘really’ thinking, just as
we can never be so sure of what we ourselves are really
thinking” (2007: 9). Self—and knowledge of the world—is
also a process, an emergence in each moment. It changes, sur-
prises us, is formed through others, human and nonhuman,
always there.
But the head cannot be split open to reveal its contents as
a bamboo tube can. The implication of Nekgini divinatoryThis content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORmystery because their actions and behaviors do reveal truth
about what is “in the head.” Humans reveal because they
cannot help but act in regard of and with regard to others
around them. The knowledge of self and other is shifting,
emergent, and partial. The delimited consciousness is always
penetrated by others and reaches out into others’ conscious-
ness as inﬂuence, motivation, concern, anger, fear, empathy.
A man’s head is emphatically not a bamboo tube. The “uni-
versality” of “autonomous, capable human actors” is not de-
pendent on an irreducible interiority.
Asserting that self is already others is not to deny indi-
viduality, not to deny that knowledge is different from oth-
ers’, as Rapport outlines so poetically, and has its own mo-
tivational and knowledge generating capacity. I agree with
Rapport: “While not isolated or independent, the life-worlds
of different human beings abut one another with conse-
quences that are unpredictable, not determinate.” What we
might question is the model of perception that sees the
senses as media conveying outside to singular interior. That
individual knowledge must somehow be separate from the
knowledge of others. Whether we consider Nekgini speakers’
practices that assume that a real knowledge is possible in the
process of relating (when due care and attention are applied)
or their equal acknowledgement of the unfolding of self in
processes not wholly in awareness or under control, they
point to the way entities and knowledge emerge in particular
relationships. These can be analyzed for individuality, moti-
vation, and identity.Maynooth, Rowan House, County Kildare, Ireland (mark.h
.maguire@nuim.ie). 4 XI 14
Limits in Wittgenstein and in Anthropology
Nigel Rapport must be congratulated for this sophisticated
essay on the nature of the pre- or nontextual sphere of hu-
man life. He challenges a long intellectual arc in which the
symbolic and language-based dimensions of collective life
have been foregrounded and treated as determining at the
expense of self-conscious, reﬂexive persons. He does not, how-
ever, erect a straw anthropological man fashioned out of dis-
cursive determinism; rather, it is a version of Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s philosophy that he attacks. And his theoretical
concerns fold into questions about writing: he uses Stirner
and Levinas contra Wittgenstein to attend to a richness and
beauty in human life that have often been left unattended.
I wish to comment on two aspects of this essay. First,
while I share Rapport’s concerns about “ordinary-language.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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philosophy,” I think that a more generous reading of Witt-
genstein is actually helpful. After all, if the intention is to free
anthropology from the prison-house of ordinary language,
determinism—Japanese culture ﬁltered through karate—and
Rapport has to willfully preserve Weir’s mystery from the
temptation to write about him as a “ﬁgure.” It is this temp-
Daniel Miller
Anthropology, University College London, 14 Taviton Street,
London WC1H 0BW, United Kingdom (d.miller@ucl.ac.uk).
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015then a richer dialogue with the alleged jailer is required. Sec-
ond, the vignette about heavy metal–loving Roger Weir serves
to illustrate the human capacity to exceed. Weir emerges in a
truly memorable way that asks questions about how anthro-
pology writes about shared and yet singular humanity.
But what of the prison-house of ordinary-language philos-
ophy? At times, Rapport’s essay chimes with Ernest Gellner’s
Language and Solitude (1998), which situates both Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy and the mise-en-scène of anthropology
in the “Hapsburg dilemma,” a culture war between atomistic
individualism and the communitarian. Wittgenstein, Gellner
says, shifted violently from the former to the latter (appar-
ently, Malinowski merely shufﬂed the deck). Wittgenstein,
Gellner says, granted a determining role to language, with
forms of life enclosing rationality and each culture becoming
self-validating and limiting. The valedictory Language and
Solitude concludes by tilting at a narrow version of Witt-
genstein: “The possibility of transcendence of cultural limits
is a fact; it is the single most important fact about human
life” (Gellner 1998:187). But a more generous reading of Witt-
genstein is helpful. In the Tractatus he remarks, “The subject
does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world”
(1961:5.632). The image suggests a visual horizon composed
of always-incomplete perspectives on an unﬁnished world.
Thus, limits are crucial, for the subject is, to borrow from
William James, forever surrounded by more—uncertainty,
doubt, and skepticism are anthropological data.
Today, key interlocutors such as Veena Das and Stanley
Cavell also attend to limits, skepticism, and a broader read-
ing of forms of life, even in Wittgenstein part II. Cavell (2013:
41–42 passim) pushes beyond the conventional “ethnologi-
cal” version of forms of life, in which language agreement
and rules seem almost contractual and underpin the natu-
rally social human being. Beyond this, however, he explores
another axis in Wittgenstein’s thought concerned with (forms
of ) life. And along this axis, according to Das, “we can ap-
preciate not only the security provided by belonging to a
community with shared agreements but also the dangers that
human beings pose to each other” (2007:15). Along this axis,
then, one notes the limits (and abutting?) of forms of life and
the potential for skepticism. Perhaps the prison-house may
not be Wittgenstein’s after all but, rather, the product of
“ethnological” conventions through which the symbolic and
language-based axis is foregrounded and treated as deter-
mining. This brings me to anthropological writing and its
conventions.
I think this essay makes its most provocative contribution
on the topic of writing: Rapport’s conceptual work reveals
itself to be partly methodological, and he asks questions about
the anthropological language needed to attend to the human
capacities of interlocutors. Of course, the heavy metal–loving
Roger Weir who concludes the text has his own discursiveThis content downloaded from 138.251.162
All use subject to JSTORtation that interests me. What are the conventions in an-
thropological writing that compel one to ﬁnd ﬁgures instead
of human beings, and often anonymous ﬁgures at that? How
might one explore more experimental forms of knowledge
production with counterparts? These questions are being
asked in diverse areas of anthropology today, for example, in
work on expert counterparts, their errors, skepticism, and
capacities for action within the contemporary. There, and in
other areas, the curiously resistant conventions and unstated
power relations of the discipline’s mise-en-scène are shown
to be unhelpful.
Rapport’s essay concludes with bonebound Roger Weir
karate-kicking his way down a hospital corridor, refuting
conventions with every blow. I was left with a desire to read
more anthropology that starts there, because the evidence
that will support Rapport’s theoretically sophisticated posi-
tion will surely be found in the writing project that begins
with Weir and others abutting a world. I was left with a de-
sire to read more about collaborations, counterparts, and
even possible interventions.23 VII 14
First, I thank Rapport for his stimulating and ambitious paper.
My intention is to use it to consider the more general issue of
the relationship between anthropology and philosophy.
Rapport starts by examining the trajectory from Witt-
genstein to the relativism of Winch and Evans-Pritchard. The
argument seems clear, but it reﬂects a very speciﬁc period of
English philosophy and anthropology that probably had lit-
tle inﬂuence on the many other variants of relativism that re-
main foundational to anthropology more generally. For those
of us interested in areas such as material culture and visual
and digital anthropology, there have been many reasons to
refuse any privileging of textual encounters and indeed of
language. So while agreeing with Rapport’s critique, one could
argue that this commitment to nontextual knowledge makes
very little difference to arguments about the signiﬁcance of
relativism or its role as foundational to anthropological stud-
ies of cultural variability.
In this case, however, Rapport wants to argue against this
relativism not on the basis of such social and material do-
mains but through presuming a pre- or supracultural form
in the corporality and nature of each unique and individual
human being. As it happens, this is a point that has also been
made of textual knowledge. Recalling debates around the
work of Chomsky and other linguists, we recognize that there.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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has long been an argument that language must be accepted
as an inherent capacity of merely being human, possessed by
each and every individual. While language has its essential
spect individuals without mystifying their integrity. We will
always have to work in worlds that make many generalized
claims and yet always though particular instances. For these
Noel B. Salazar
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Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000social and cultural properties, we afﬁrm that in both speak-
ing and writing people retain the capacity to communicate
unique experiences in unique ways. At the same time, ac-
knowledging our biological affordance to language has not
prevented the emergence of stridently relativist arguments,
such as those of Wittgenstein. So rather than a dualist oppo-
sition, perhaps it is better to regard the claim to the uniqueness
and individuality of each person as the end of a spectrum that
also includes the claim to the uniqueness and speciﬁcity of
culture.
Over many works Rapport has sought to rescue the ap-
preciation of individuals against their suppression in an-
thropological generalization. Again, I would support Rapport
in this, and I ﬁnd that, in my own writing as in his, it is im-
portant to have the kind of stories he ends with to make that
point. But I would suggest this should be a question of bal-
ance, not a simple opposition. So my criticism is that Rapport
takes this to an extreme, and the reason for this in this pa-
per is that he is not here writing balanced ethnography but
turning to philosophy. Just because Levinas is a renowned
philosopher, his claims that the relationship to the other is
absolute and his discussion of the irreducible nature of the
face of the other are not in themselves evidence for such
claims. Indeed, these citations make clear that Levinas is
largely concerned with the particular responsibility of phi-
losophy as a discipline and his own theological concerns. It
does not create an anthropological argument that when we
pursue pre- or supratextual knowledge we thereby encounter
a human corporality that is unique and a mystery.
This exempliﬁes the problem of anthropology’s relation-
ship to philosophy, which has become asymmetrical and
detrimental to the discipline. Increasingly, anthropologists
look to philosophy to resolve issues we ﬁnd difﬁcult, too ﬂuid,
and too disparate. Philosophy can certainly achieve the am-
bitions we have for it, because it provides levels of abstrac-
tion where things can be resolved in semantics and logic.
Anthropology is better served by resisting this allure of phi-
losophy and refusing to privilege any dimension of its en-
counter, be it language, cognition, or ego. Instead, it should
retain its grounding in comparative ethnography and argue
on the basis of what we ﬁnd and can ourselves attest to. It may
be harder, but I would suggest that it is always better to be
unresolved anthropologists than resolved philosophers.
So I blame philosophy for leading Rapport from a useful
critique to a concluding section where he argues that either
we accept a social analysis where culture is homogenizing or
determinant or we accept these philosophers’ privileging of
the unique individual. It is philosophy that requires this kind
of precision and distinction. At least since Bourdieu, most
anthropologists have accepted that culture, in the sense of the
normative, is neither deterministic nor a rule. Many actual
instances will fail to accord with cultural claims. We can re-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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ment to demystiﬁcation than standing in awe of any mystery
of ego, or irreducibility of ontology for that matter. Let’s leave
that to the philosophers.In this thought-provoking piece, Nigel Rapport argues that
human beings have the intuitive perceptual capacity to rec-
ognize a commensurateness in fellow humans that goes be-
yond the sociocultural and historical contingencies of time
and place. The title is slightly misleading because the article
draws on the philosophical thinking of both Emmanuel Le-
vinas and the lesser-known Max Stirner. Rapport confronts
us, once again, with an old tension within the discipline be-
tween the enlightened universalism of “anthropos” and the
romantic diversitarianism of “ethnos” (Stocking 1992). His-
torically, the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states
and the era of imperial and colonial expansionism led to a
disproportionate stress on the study of “difference.” Main-
stream sociocultural anthropology became conﬂated with the
project of ethnography (Ingold 2008), namely, the systematic
study and description of individual human cultures.
Ironically, processes of (mostly cultural) globalization have
renewed the anthropological attention paid to human uni-
versals and universal humanity. This is most often couched
in the popular language of cosmopolitanism (Wardle 2010).
Rapport (2012a) himself has been promoting “cosmopolitan
anthropology,” which may be conceived of as a return to the
discipline’s Enlightenment origins (and an antidote to dom-
inant postmodern ideas). When Immanuel Kant ﬁrst for-
mulated anthropology as a modern project, a science of hu-
mankind, what he had in mind was precisely the linking up
of the individual human being, in its everyday diversity, and
its more global historical commonality.
Inspired by Stirner and Levinas, Rapport advocates for “a
duty of distance and of ignorance concerning the substance
of other individual human lives.” Anthropological knowing,
he argues, comprises “the progressive understanding of a
universal human condition” (a “scientiﬁc discernment of hu-
man capacities”). This point of view relates to a strand in
anthropological epistemology that stresses the importance of
“strangeness” in the ethnographic encounter and the fact
that there always remains a (necessary) distance between the
self and the other (Agar 1996). This leaves room for mystery
and wonder, for passion and anarchy, in brief, for an aes-
thetic appreciation of the human other (Autrui) that exceeds.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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the comprehension of the ego and exists independently of
any relation to that ego. While the anthropologist in the ﬁeld
may get close to grasping human complexity, from the mo-
Huon Wardle
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000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015ment ethnography becomes writing he or she is caught in
(con)text and interpretation. What exactly gets lost in trans-
lating “pretextual, nonconventional, acultural knowing” to
“an emergent technical textualization”? Would nontextual
forms of data gathering and analysis serve us any better?
For Levinas, it is the “face,” the singularity of an impression
that is absolutely unique, that reveals absolute otherness in
the other person (Benson and O’Neill 2007). Rapport, too,
stresses the importance of “ego’s face-to-face relation with
the other.” However, in today’s world, many interactions be-
tween people no longer take place in a face-to-face context
that allows a direct, prerational engagement with others. What
does Rapport’s anthropology have to say about a humanity that
is increasingly mediating human interaction through “dis-
tancing” information and communication technologies? How
would he respond to the critique that his vision of anthropol-
ogy is overly subjectivist and anthropocentric? Is it not putting
too much stress on individuality and giving too much agency
to the individual? Should anthropology automatically exclude
that which lies beyond the human (however broad or narrow
the latter is deﬁned)?
All people on this planet may share a similar potential to
become “an autonomous, capable human actor,” but far from
everybody is able to realize that potential. Rapport’s stress on
corporeality—the “ﬂesh and mind” of the self (Stirner) and
the “body and face” of the other (Levinas)—leads to questions
regarding the “boundaries” of universal humanity. From
which point in a person’s life trajectory does the human organ
of perception that “enables ego to know alter” become func-
tional, and when does it stop working? The proposed philo-
sophical model is based on an ideal-type able-bodied and
able-minded human. In which ways can the organ of per-
ception malfunction, and what does this tell us about uni-
versal humanity? Moreover, if humans have “the perceptual
capability of recognizing universally a humanity that is dis-
tinct from thinghood and from animality and from tech-
nology,” how do they deal with instances where individual
corporeal boundaries are not all that clear (e.g., Siamese
twins)? Answering these queries related to abnormality may
help ﬁne-tune the model.
Finally, Rapport stresses that his contribution is theoret-
ical and epistemological. Indeed, the questions he addresses
are mainly philosophical ones. Anthropology ideally addresses
these issues “in the world,” but Rapport does not elaborate
much on the methodologies through which anthropologists
in particular can obtain access to the assumed commonality
that unites humans. Which methodological toolbox do we
have at our disposal? For many anthropologists, essays like
this one are most likely perceived as highly abstract and dif-
ﬁcult to apply outside the given conceptual frame. In sum,
Rapport’s provocative text probably raises more questions
than it answers.This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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This essay, drawing centrally on Stirner and Levinas, nudges
us to rethink anthropology by paying a new type of atten-
tion to the self-conscious individual human being. The kind
of anthropology Rapport has in mind would reconnect us
with the liberal idealist thinkers of a previous era, who placed
free-acting individuality at the center of their (philosophical)
anthropologies. In particular, he goes back to Stirner (meth-
odological egoism), adapting Stirner’s concerns to those of a
more familiar contemporary philosophical voice, Levinas’s
(the mystery of the other), in order to highlight how mar-
ginalized the human self has become during the past decades
of anthropological thought.
Suddenly, as it were, Rapport reveals to us that contem-
porary social inquiry shows little, if any, interest in actual
selves, since the primary engagement is still with modeled
subjectivities and these only for what they demonstrate
about a larger cultural ﬁeld, of which individuals are con-
sidered to be a fold. I strongly agree with the need Rapport
is describing—the need to put the speciﬁcity (including the
vagary, the inconsequence) of individual life back into the
center of anthropological thinking and likewise the need
to reassert philosophical anthropology as a counterpoint to
structural or other modes of cultural-contextual accounting
for human experience.
It is worth drawing on another nineteenth-century thinker
here—Thomas Hill Green—to foreground key points. Green’s
liberal idealism was posited against the social evolutionism
of his day that would reduce individuality to an arbitrary ex-
pression of social-environmental forces. For Green (as for Rap-
port), the human individual is a spontaneous, self-realizing
being whose self-consciousness freely and actively introduces
newness into its relationship with the world. The individual
is certainly, however, also a mystery both to others and to
itself. The self remains a mystery to itself because it can
know what it is only by remaking its personality in the world
out of circumstances that its interactions have previously
endowed with signiﬁcance. Individual self-insight develops
not absolutely but rather in time out of a series of contin-
gent, will-imbued interventions.
As Green notes, the decision to give priority to the indi-
vidual—as opposed to the social class, the in-group, the peo-
ple, the state apparatus, the culture, God, or gods—is an
epistemological one. Post-Enlightenment philosophy opened
up the radical thought that everyone should count for one
and none for more than one (a view shared, with diverging
ramiﬁcations, by Stirner and J. S. Mill, for example), but this
stance was (and has continued to be) challenged on all sides—
by corporations and would-be power brokers of every stamp.
Meanwhile, the emerging art forms of Green’s time, particu-.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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larly the modern novel, acted as “expander[s] of sympathies,”
swelling the democratic and cosmopolitan impulse to see
any individual life-project as of equal ultimate value to an-
“Every gesture, however simple, represents a violation of a
spiritual secret” (2010:256). There are Levinasian echoes here:
the ignorance pertaining to what can be known of other hu-
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000other (Green 1862:31)—an artistic democratization mas-
sively intensiﬁed via the media of our time.
In the ethnographic part of his essay, Rapport shows em-
phatically how it is possible to describe individual life and
experience beyond the standard anthropological trope that
human “rationality [is] circumscribed by the discursive op-
portunities made available by a ‘culture,’ ” This element of
the paper demands careful reﬂection. The main assertion,
that Roger Weir’s rationality is not limited to a given dis-
cursive or cultural set, is well shown and well taken. How-
ever, even if it does not determine how Roger Weir realizes
himself, the discursive range does nonetheless index the
circumstances out of which spring Weir’s desires and his
motivations; hence, it forms the background against which
his particular élan shows up. This contrast is perhaps hidden
by the fact that the hospital is a familiar type of place for
most Euro-American readers. Even so, the hospital as a train
of affordances is clearly and necessarily part of how we re-
ﬂect on Weir’s life. Hence, we are left with the question
What is afforded to Roger Weir by this (as opposed to an-
other) situation? But this should not overrule the equally
important one, What does Roger Weir freely make out of his
life?
In a world where the cosmopolitanization of experience is
increasingly unavoidable, where in their sympathetic imag-
ining individuals continuously ﬁnd themselves both some-
where and elsewhere, the image of subjectivity as a fold of
a preﬁgured culture must then become, if it is not already,
intellectually unviable (Wardle 2000, 2009, forthcoming).
Shifting our gaze from already-exhausted cultural forms to
the potentials that individuals freely combine toward self-
realization demands that we think, to use Green’s words,
about the “unapparent possibilities” of human individual-
ity—“capabilities for [living in] some society not seen as yet”
(1883:279). It may be that it is only through an epistemo-
logical reorientation toward subjective futures, then, that it
becomes truly possible to make sense of the liberal claim
(which I take to be crucial for Rapport, too) that everyone
should count for one, none for more than one.ReplyIn The Book of Disquiet, published after his death in 1935, the
Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa wrote, “The only reason we
get on together is that we know nothing about one another”
(2010:236). (Likewise, from Baudelaire [1961:1297]: “If, by
some mischance, people understood each other, they would
never be able to reach agreement.”) And Pessoa goes on:This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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translate that radical difference—the gratuitousness or ab-
solute is-ness of individuality—into symbolic-conventional
terms.
In a recent essay on translation, the classicist Anne Carson
urges an acceptance of untranslatability as a human condi-
tion. Verbal usage and experience have at their core a kind of
metaphysical silence, Carson writes (2014:4). The only way
to overcome this in conventional terms—in terms of our
normal practices of transliteration—is to have recourse to
cliche. But cliches must be refused if one’s intention is to
provide authentic testimony to the otherness of other human
beings and their gratuitous expression.
Carson offers three examples, the ﬁrst drawn from the trial
of Joan of Arc (the others are from the painting of Francis
Bacon and the poetry of Hölderlin). Caught in battle on
May 23, 1430, Joan of Arc was tried from January to May
1431 (and burned on May 30, 1431). Joan’s “defense” was
that her guidance, military and moral, came from a source
she called “voices,” commanding her dress, her actions, her
politics, and her beliefs. The prosecution insisted that she
name and describe the voices in terms of orthodox religious
imagery and in a conventional narrative—that they could
then disprove. But Joan refused this, blocked it as long as
possible. Her voices had no conventional forms; they were
simply an experienced fact, and Joan refused to translate
them into theological cliche: she insisted on their irreduci-
bility to formulaicism. Finally, on February 24, 1430, as a
kind of summary of her position, Joan said, “The light comes
in the name of the voice.” Was this not a sentence that, as
Carson declares (2014:10), “stops itself ”? Joan’s words are
apparently simple yet remain impressively foreign and un-
ownable in essence.
The Face of God is the title of a recent book of metaphys-
ics by philosopher Roger Scruton. “The face shines in the
world of objects with a light that is not of this world,” Scru-
ton writes (2012:49). He refers to both “the light of subjec-
tivity” and the light of a divinity that instills in the human
an intentionality, activity, and freedom that cannot be dis-
tilled in objective terms. Is there not a terrible separation be-
tween a self-conscious human being and the world to which
he or she belongs, Scruton ponders, and does not the human
face embody an extraordinary portentousness?
I ﬁnd myself drawn to insight of this existential kind—
delivered here by a poet, a classicist, and a philosopher. They
speak to me of what Michael Oakeshott—another philos-
opher—referred to as “the conversation of mankind” and
what he saw as the greatest human accomplishment. In this
civil conversation, “thoughts of different species [science,
poetry, history] take wing and play round one another,” re-
spond to and provoke one another, in an unrehearsed and
cumulative intellectual adventure (Oakeshott 1962:197–200)..205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
 Terms and Conditions
I wish my anthropology to partake of this humanistic con-
versation, and I want to allow myself to be inspired by it.
Each discipline of genuine inquiry will have its metier, but
polarizing their worth? Is not the truth of social life its ca-
paciousness: a space where both individuals and nonindi-
viduals, individualism and communalism, thrive? There is
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015the point is to converse. Must I clearly demarcate an “an-
thropological” practice, however? My immediate response is
that I am led to ﬁnd inspiration in the above insights (Pes-
soa’s, Baudelaire’s, Carson’s, Scruton’s, Oakeshott’s—Stirner’s,
Levinas’s) because they resonate with my ethnographic expe-
rience: I feel empowered by the comparative and interdisci-
plinary corroboration of the truths that is effected. My an-
thropology can be found party to an ongoing accumulation
of knowledge in which different modes of inquiry and of ex-
pression collaborate. Together, a universalist human science
is grown.
I appreciate, too, the intellectual engagement and the gen-
erosity practiced above by my nine commentators. I judge
that there are (at least) nine discrete charges, which I brieﬂy
attempt to answer.
First charge. Is there not a clear distinction to be observed
between anthropology and philosophy as disciplinary orien-
tations? Whereas philosophy operates at a level of abstrac-
tion where semantics and logic can be looked to for speciﬁc
resolutions, anthropology devotes itself to a comparative eth-
nography, to providing evidence of a world where things
normally remain unresolved (Daniel Miller). For instance, it
might make philosophical sense to model a typically capable
human being, but anthropology must place these issues in the
world where potentials are not realized and the functionality
of perception is not equally shared (Noel Salazar).
My response. I feel that I share with the philosopher—with
the humanist as such—three speciﬁc questions I would wish
my anthropology to answer: (1) What are the truths of the
human condition, and how may we know? (2) What are the
appropriate forms for representing these truths? (3) What
ethical living arrangements best respect these truths? I also
admire the cogency of argumentation that philosophy de-
mands of itself. I respect absolutely Kant’s ontological in-
sights, say, Nietzsche’s aesthetic insights, Mill’s ethical in-
sights. Indeed, I would deﬁne my anthropology (après Kant)
in “cosmopolitan” terms: it is a project about the ontology of
our humanity, about the aesthetics of representation, and
about the morality of a free society. But this is not to say that
anthropology does not make a distinctive and vital contri-
bution: it provides the pure data from which universal for-
mulations of ontology, aesthetics, and ethics are to be de-
rived. It is the empirical exploration of the materiality of
bodies and the resistance of the world. It delivers insights
into consciousness in media res: in an individual body, in
time, in space, in situation, operating amid a world of spe-
ciﬁc otherness (organic and inorganic). How near can I
approach to Roger Weir, and how near to the others with
whom he interacted? Anthropology-cum-philosophy spans
the arc between the particular and the general, individuality
and humanity, the actual and the potential.
Second charge. Is not a reciprocation between contrasting
positions and paradigms more intellectually rewarding thanThis content downloaded from 138.251.162
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(Heonik Kwon). Balancing unique individuals, then, are
unique cultures, and balancing cultural claims to rules are ac-
tual instances of indeterminacy. Privilege neither dimension,
and avoid the irreducibilities of ontology (Daniel Miller).
My response. But truth is more important than compro-
mise. I do not want to give respect to a contrastive position
that is untrue; there is too much at stake. The truth of social
life is that its constituent units are living individual human
beings, not communities or cultures or classes. Individual
human beings and (individual) cultures and communities
are things of different kinds: they do not share the same
status in reality. Human beings possess an ontological real-
ity, while cultures and communities are constructs of dis-
course: fabrications about which we fantasize. I feel that it is
a humanistic duty to recognize an absolute difference be-
tween an ontological truth and the world it evinces, on the
one hand, and the world of symbols and rhetorics, on the
other. Not to privilege the former over the latter—not to
push for a victorious endgame here—and not to insist on the
irreducibility of ontological truths is to give credence to ne-
science. It is to invite all manner of human repression, in the
name of “culture”, “tradition”, “multiculturalism”, “identity
politics,” and so on. The endgame must be when individuals
are respected as things-in-themselves: not means to others’
ends, not identiﬁed according to others’ categorical ascrip-
tions, not trapped in belongings—cultural, ethnic, religious,
communitarian—that are not of their own mature choice.
Third charge. How does the register of anthropological
discourse accord to ethnography? Take the Nekgini-speaking
people of Papua New Guinea. In their thought and practice,
the constitution of a human being is the ongoing project of
others, both in terms of body or ﬂesh and in terms of con-
sciousness: both are the product of the labor and knowledge
of others with whom “one” is in relationship. Here, “self” is
already “others,” and consciousness always penetrated by
others and aimed at others (James Leach).
My response. I hope cosmopolitan anthropology to be a
component of human science, deepening knowledge of what
it is to be human: concerning human capacities and how in-
dividuals come to operationalize or substantiate these. Our
capacities possess a factual character that is a common lim-
iting factor to our universal humanity, while individual sub-
stantiations may include fabrications or inventions that oc-
cupy imaginative terrains. In human life, certain “facts” stand
by themselves, we might say, while others depend on human
recognition and maintenance. “Science” is a name for the
former facts and “religion” a variant of the latter. This is not to
say that “dependent” facts or fabrications (religion, mythol-
ogy, ideology, fantasy) cannot have real consequences when
people act as if they were independent facts—“I am a suicide-
bomber because God ordains this a holy act”; “It is destiny
that my lover and I should marry”—but it is to insist that.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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anthropology always makes the distinction. It is an indepen-
dent fact that human beings are mortal and that penicillin is
curative; it is a dependent fact that women have no souls or are
uating, and new: made by individual sense-making energies
and capacities and also party to a life history of such sense
making.
Rapport Anthropology through Levinas 000intrinsically modest or that the world is ﬂat or that people can
become jaguars. Does the anthropologist have a duty to re-
spect others’ dependent facts? As aesthetic choices voluntarily
undertaken in maturity, such facts can be recognized as ful-
ﬁlling signiﬁcant desires for belonging, for beauty, for plea-
sure, for meaning: “I like belonging to this synagogue or the
Conservative Party, or to support Arsenal Football Club, not
Chelsea”; “It brings me pleasure to read Virginia Woolf, or to
speak the Nekgini language”; “I ﬁnd Stanley Spencer’s
paintings beautiful, and equally so fantasizing that my con-
sciousness is penetrated by my kinsmen”; “My life’s meaning
attaches to material security, or to hearing divine voices.”
However, anthropology does not confuse or conﬂate ontology
with aesthetics. Indeed, it an ethical project to work to ensure
that human beings do not suffer from the distinction’s being
unrecognized or ignored. The aesthetics of how a particular
life is substantiated—how it accrues meaning, pleasure,
beauty, and belonging—is ideally a matter of universal indi-
vidual choices, choices made in the knowledge of a growing
human treasury of what is factually true.
Fourth charge. Was not being touched by another human
being—literally and metaphorically—for Levinas a founda-
tional event: something that preceded identities, categories,
and relations? Touch elicited being and also elicited obliga-
tion between the entities that emerged (passively) from it
(Paul Wenzel Geissler). To be touched by difference is to be
disturbed, pushed beyond a predisposition to habitude, even
toward radical revaluation (Anne Line Dalsgård).
My response. I appreciate these as aesthetic claims:
“Touched when encountering Roger Weir, my life began
anew.” But I do not accept them as ontological truths. In
order to be touched, my body and its interpretative capaci-
ties—including a predisposition to be touched—must pre-
cede any such encounter. In order to recognize something as
an environmental affordance—in order to have my sense of
self and my practical habits exist in an assemblage comprised
of my body in conjunction with other things in the world
(other bodies, tools, food)—I must ﬁrst have the capacity to be
a center of energy that may recognize and may exist. Second, I
will possess a particular history of recognizing and existing, an
ontogeny, that is unique to me. This unique history of being
a body that interacts with what lies around it may be touched
and disturbed, certainly, but not in such a way as to absolve
it of that history and elicit a new being. There is only one
beginning to a life and one end. More than this, the unique
history of being a body that a human being begins, with its
own energy or “intentionality,” even before birth—engaging
with what lies beyond it in an exploratory and learning way
in its development of consciousness—and that ends only with
death means that at any point along that unique trajectory of
a life it will be touched and disturbed in ways consequent
upon its own history of knowing. The meaning of any en-
counter is irreducibly individual, however shocking, dishabit-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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of social relations (après Buber) as “I-You” that is missing
in the more conventional conceptualizations of “I-It”? “I-
You” mediates the dualism of ﬁrst-person subjectivity against
third-person objectivity and so might obviate othering. “I-
You” introduces the possibility of a practical engaging with,
responding to, and learning from, another human being that
is mutual and moral, as against prescribed and categorical
(Andrew Irving)?
My response. I hear how similar Buber and Levinas can
sound, also in their naming of God as the ﬁnal guarantor of
meaning. (Buber: When we speak to Him [“I-You”], not of
Him [“I-It”], we encounter a living God. By a combination
of divine grace and human will we can enter into a relation-
ship with another as a unique fellow subject, not an It that
we objectify according to our own norms and categories.) I am
nevertheless wary of privileging relationality, of accepting a
dialogics of identity whereby the self is constituted only by
and through the other. I would argue that, in important ways
and extents, the social relations to which I am signiﬁcantly
party are dependent on my imagination of them—whether
those relations be with my spouse or with Friedrich Nietz-
sche or with Mrs. Dalloway (a ﬁctional character). I inhabit
my relations according to my construal of them, even in ex-
tremis (Primo Levi: “It must be remembered that each of us,
both objectively and subjectively, lived the Lager in his own
way” [1996:56]). When Buber writes that my authenticity,
my presentness, and my freedom depend on the I-You re-
lation, then I feel that a state of intrinsic difference is being
misrecognized. When I depict the empirical focus of anthro-
pological study as the effects that human beings as individual
energetic things-in-the-world have on one another, I antic-
ipate a relationality that, however potentially reciprocal, is
also likely to be tangential, indirect, and unintended. Rela-
tions begin from discrete things-in-themselves, and their sub-
stance and effects end with discrete things-in-themselves.
Sixth charge. Does not context have to play more of a role
here? Since individuals’ insights develop in time and space,
prior circumstances, while not determinant, may still provide
a background. Think of the hospital as a range of discourses
against which Roger Weir’s life proceeds (Huon Wardle). Or
think of how new information and communication technol-
ogies increasingly mediate social interaction that is no longer
face to face, close, or direct, whether in a hospital setting or
elsewhere (Noel Salazar).
My response. I am leery of the way in which context is
deployed to “explain” individual action and consciousness:
“This is why so-and-so acted as they did.” It is so often an
impersonalizing and departicularizing analytical device; there
are, moreover, so many possible “contexts” to a life. Two
contexts would seem primary. First are the perspectives
that individuals construe, the worldviews: the lives that they
perceive themselves to be living and the lines of action, the.205 on Tue, 24 Mar 2015 06:37:09 AM
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life-projects, that they adjudge appropriate, given their cir-
cumstances. Second is the circumstance that an individual’s
species nature entails. A human life is ﬁnite, with a range of
tional wholes and not simply secure in their identities but
also vulnerable and susceptible: skeptical of themselves, ig-
norant of themselves, forever uncertain, open, and in dan-
Agar, Michael. 1996. The professional stranger: an informal introduction to
000 Current Anthropology Volume 56, Number 2, April 2015capabilities and liabilities. Context is afforded by the fact that
an individual human being can imagine social relations but
cannot physically ﬂy, and so on. Any other contextualizations
are epiphenomenal on these foundational or ontological ones.
For instance, the individual may live in a sociocultural milieu
where his or her individuality is not recognized or esteemed;
perhaps they are narrowly categorized as a speciﬁc kind of
actor—“elder,” “slave,” “impure,” “apostate,” “celebrity,” and
so on. Certainly, these epiphenomenal contextualizations are
consequential: the individual is kept in purdah, perhaps, or
kept hungry, or is feted; the individual is perhaps invited to
communicate by electronic media, at a distance, more than
face to face. Even granting that these contexts are not de-
terminant of identity, individual or human, how do we de-
scribe their role? I return to the distinction that Simmel saw
as foundational (and borrowed from Kant) concerning forms
as against meanings. In order to describe the effects of so-
ciocultural forms in social settings—forms such as hospital
discourses or information and communications technolo-
gies—the anthropologist always needs to discern the mean-
ings that individual users are making by way of them. There
is an ambiguity intrinsic to any discourse of social engage-
ment, a plasticity, such that there need be no homogeneous or
determinant relation between the forms and their particular
usage. What is the meaning of purdah, of celebrity, of the
Lager, of being a hospital porter? I must anticipate Roger
Weir’s freedom: I cannot prejudge how an individual life is
“contextualized” by a discourse of public symbolic forms.
Seventh charge. Might we not expect culture to manifest
itself somehow in individuals’ moments of sensibility, in
their bodily and affective responses (Anne Line Dalsgård)? Is
not the distinction between body and language overcome
when Levinas insists that “language is proximity”: something
that concerns penetration more than mere representation
(Paul Wenzel Geissler)?
My response. How a body immerses itself in a set of sym-
bolic forms—how it is “penetrated” by a language, for in-
stance—is individually empowered or energized, I have ar-
gued, and possesses an individual character or effect. Reading
John Stuart Mill’s words in On Liberty conjures a powerful
affective “reaction” in me: I feel grateful, hopeful, vindicated,
empowered. However, I would feel demeaned were it sug-
gested that my response was intrinsically “cultural”: rote,
normative, passive. Derrida made the argument that language
could be proven to be sui generis for the effects it manifestly
had beyond “authorial” intention and after “an author’s”
death. But there is always intentionality: wherever cultural
forms gain meaning (and affect), it is on the intentions of
those who employ them (who put themselves in a position to
be affected) that attention has to focus.
Eighth charge. Do we not need to maintain a sense of the
incompleteness of human subjects, their being less than ra-This content downloaded from 138.251.162
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to themselves as well as to others? Viewed positively, this
means individuals able to ﬁnd themselves continuously in
“unapparent possibilities,” to realize themselves in “else-
wheres” not yet seen (Huon Wardle).
My response. Yes, I would not like to be seen as advocat-
ing closure. I have used the concept of “life-project” to explore
the ways in which human beings can go on making them-
selves—being ironic in relation to themselves, authoring on-
going futures for themselves—and how having the right and
the space to effect this is the mark of a free society. I have
also used the concept “cosmopolitan politesse” to examine the
ways and extents to which others might assist and succor in-
dividuals in their life-projects—in what are intrinsically pri-
vate and personal matters. This implies that we are our own
mysteries—our own incompletenesses, our own irrationali-
ties, and our own insecurities—and no one else’s. Moreover,
the extent to which we are mysterious and the ways in which
we are mysterious calibrate with no external or public or nor-
mative measurement. There can be no speciﬁc (“cultural”) way
in which incompleteness or mysteriousness should be done;
and there can be no exterior (“social”) mechanism by which
individuals have it done for them. Anxiety is the feeling of
freedom, in Kierkegaard’s formulation.
Ninth charge. The challenge is to textualize in anthropol-
ogy what is nontextual in experience: from the sensory ma-
terialities of life to the wondrous, the disturbing, and the
empty. Fieldwork opens one up to unpredictability. How
do we write of the energizing effects of these ruptures (Anne
Line Dalsgård)? How do we get beyond the anthropological
convention of writing about anonymous social “ﬁgures”?
Should we not experiment (collaboratively with our research
subjects, too) to ﬁnd ways of representing the human beings
we have actually come to know (Mark Maguire)?
My response. Yes. I would hope for experimentation that
is not precious about disciplinary boundaries or traditions
of representation. (I have certainly drawn inspiration from
others’ artistry: E. M. Forster, Philip Larkin, W. G. Sebald,
Stanley Spencer.) The objective always is to transliterate an
experience of another life or lives. There is no formula for
this and no limit. Each research, authentically acknowledged
by the anthropologist—What did I experience, and what do I
feel I came to know?—ideally opens up its own way in which
it feels appropriate to be represented.
—Nigel Rapport
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